Cowboys and Contracts
AbstractThis article expands Harold Demsetz's seminal work on property rights by arguing that property rights entrepreneurs discover previously unowned or unpriced attributes of a resource and capture rents by defining and enforcing rights to those attributes. To keep the rents from these new uses from being dissipated in the tragedy of the commons, the entrepreneur must contract to exclude others from the value of his perception. We describe specific and general contracting and use the frontier of the American West to illustrate the two. A central theme is that smaller, homogeneous groups are more likely to prevent rent dissipation and that more centralized political processes are more likely to encourage it. Copyright 2002 by the University of Chicago.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Legal Studies.
Volume (Year): 31 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLS/
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- Lee J. Alston & Edwyna Harris & Bernardo Mueller, 2009.
"De Facto and De Jure Property Rights: Land Settlement and Land Conflict on the Australian, Brazilian and U.S. Frontiers,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
607, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
- Lee J. Alston & Edwyna Harris & Bernardo Mueller, 2009. "De Facto and De Jure Property Rights: Land Settlement and Land Conflict on the Australian, Brazilian and U.S. Frontiers," NBER Working Papers 15264, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Skarbek, David, 2012. "Prison gangs, norms, and organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 96-109.
- David Skarbek, 2009. "Alertness, local knowledge, and Johnny Appleseed," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 415-424, December.
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