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The Roman Familia: A view from the economics of property

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Abstract

This chapter presents an analytical framework that draws upon the economics of personal and real rights, which helps in understanding the institutions of the Roman familia. The discussion proceeds in four stages. First, it outlines the central tenets of the theory, which regards the formalization of transactions as a critical, secondary, public "contractual" step for creating a tradable legal commodity, specifically robust property (real) rights that are enforceable in rem against everyone but do not increase transaction costs. Second, it applies the theory to the marriage contract, a fundamental component of family law. Third, the chapter examines some of the primary features of Roman personal contracting from this analytical perspective, particularly the standard transactions related to the Roman familia, which is better comprehended as a household than as a mere family. Lastly, it focuses on one of the main features of Roman family law: the dowry, explaining the tendency to enforce it as a right in rem.

Suggested Citation

  • Benito Arruñada, 2023. "The Roman Familia: A view from the economics of property," Economics Working Papers 1869, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:1869
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Benito Arruñada, 2010. "Institutional Support of the Firm: A Theory of Business Registries," Working Papers 508, Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Benito Arruñada & Giorgio Zanarone & Nuno Garoupa, 2019. "Property Rights in Sequential Exchange," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(1), pages 127-153.
    3. Benito ArruÒada, 2003. "Property Enforcement as Organized Consent," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 401-444, October.
    4. Gary S. Becker, 1981. "A Treatise on the Family," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck81-1, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economics of ancient law; economics of ancient societies; econ.analysis of Roman law; law and economics; family law; dowry; property rights; transaction costs; personal exchange; new institutional ec;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • K36 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Family and Personal Law
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • N13 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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