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Managing Competition in Professional Services and the Burden of Inertia

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Author Info
Benito Arruñada ()

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Abstract

Professional services are characterized by information asymmetries, economies of scope and externalities. To resolve conflicts of interest, they require special organizational formulas, based on deferred and variable compensation, self-selection and, when positive externalities are necessary, competitive restraints. In principle, a set of criteria and organizational design patterns could be used for assessing, managing and regulating all types of professional organization, whether public or private, competitive or monopolistic. Competitive restraints, however, entail substantial risks, one of the main ones being that they tend to outlast their useful life. This point has been illustrated here by examining pharmacists and conveyancers, two professions for which the existing restraints may today be dysfunctional to the extent that the services that might have made such restraints necessary are provided by other public and private agents. Greater liberalization is therefore advisable, especially for standard services, and not only from a public interest perspective but also from the private interest perspective of the professions themselves. If my argument is correct,liberalization would encourage professionals to quit providing trivial services and focus on those which make efficient use of professionals’ knowledge and add greater value to users, what nowadays seems to be the only sustainable strategy in a dynamic society.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 827.

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Date of creation: May 2005
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Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:827

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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

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Related research
Keywords: professions; competition; lawyers; notaries; pharmacists;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-29, March-Apr. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kraakman, Reiner H, 1986. "Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 53-104, Spring.
  4. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
  5. Benito Arruñada, 2004. "Quality safeguards and regulation of online pharmacies," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(4), pages 329-344. [Downloadable!]
  6. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-40, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-41, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Shapiro, Carl, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(4), pages 659-79, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
  10. Lazear, Edward P, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1261-84, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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