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Cheating for the common good in a Macroeconomic policy game

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Francisco Álvarez González (Université de la Méditerranée (Aix-MarseilleII))
Christophe Deissenberg (Universidad Complutense, Madrid, Spain)

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Abstract

This paper presents a simple repeated-game model of interaction between an optimizing government and the private sector. Two polar cases are considered: (a) the private sector is represented by a single agent; and (b) there is a continuum of heterogenous atomistic private agents. In both cases, the government starts each repetition by making a non-binding announcement about its future actions. The players have complete and perfect information, with one exception: the private agents do not know whether or not the government will act as announced. Thus, each private agent i either behaves with probability ði as if it trusted the announcement, or plays with probability 1 . ði as a Stackelberg leader. After observing the reaction of the private sector, the government

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales in its series Documentos del Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico with number 0104.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:ucm:doicae:0104

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  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. McCallum, Bennett T., 1997. "Crucial issues concerning central bank independence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 99-112, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Borgers, Tilman & Sarin, Rajiv, 1997. "Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 1-14, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1987. "Reputational constraints on monetary policy," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 141-181, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Kenneth Rogoff, 1987. "Reputational Constraints on Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1986, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Backus, David & Driffill, John, 1985. "Inflation and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 530-38, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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