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Optimal open loop cheating in dynamic reversedLinear ‐ Quadratic Stackelberg games

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  • T. Vallée
  • Ch. Deissenberg
  • T. Basar

Abstract

The distinctive characteristic of a “Reversed Stackelberg Game” is that the leader playstwice, first by announcing his future action, second by implementing a possibly differentaction given the follower's reaction to his announcement. In such a game, if the leader usesthe normal Stackelberg solution to find (and announce) his optimal strategy, there is a strongtemptation for him to cheat, that is, to implement another action than the one announced. Inthis paper, within the framework of a standard discrete time Linear‐Quadratic DynamicReversed Stackelberg game, we discuss and derive the best possible open‐loop cheatingstrategy for an unscrupulous leader. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

Suggested Citation

  • T. Vallée & Ch. Deissenberg & T. Basar, 1999. "Optimal open loop cheating in dynamic reversedLinear ‐ Quadratic Stackelberg games," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 88(0), pages 217-232, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:88:y:1999:i:0:p:217-232:10.1023/a:1018982313949
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1018982313949
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    Cited by:

    1. Dawid, Herbert & Deissenberg, Christophe, 2005. "On the efficiency-effects of private (dis-)trust in the government," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 57(4), pages 530-550, August.
    2. Deissenberg, Christophe & Gonzalez, Francisco Alvarez, 2002. "Cheating for the common good in a macroeconomic policy game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 26(9-10), pages 1457-1479, August.
    3. Kendrick, David A., 2005. "Stochastic control for economic models: past, present and the paths ahead," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 3-30, January.
    4. Thomas Vallée, 2018. "Comparison of different Stackelberg solutions in a deterministic dynamic pollution control: the time inconsistency problem revisited," Working Papers halshs-01843717, HAL.

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