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Learning benevolent leadership in a heterogenous agents economy

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  • Arifovic, Jasmina
  • Dawid, Herbert
  • Deissenberg, Christophe
  • Kostyshyna, Olena

Abstract

This paper studies the potential commitment value of cheap talk announcements in an agent-based dynamic extension of the Kydland-Prescott model. In every period, the policy maker makes a non-binding inflation announcement before setting the actual inflation rate. It updates its decisions using individual evolutionary learning. The private agents can choose between two different forecasting strategies: They can either set their forecast equal to the announcement or use an adaptive learning scheme to (potentially) forecast the true inflation. They switch between these two strategies as a function of information about the associated payoffs they obtain through word-of-mouth, choosing always the currently most favorable one. While all agents using the first strategy make the same forecast, those using the second strategy may generate different individual forecasts. In spite of the complexity of the environment, the boundedly rational policy maker learns to sustain a situation with a positive but fluctuating fraction of believers. This outcome is Pareto superior to the outcome predicted by standard theory. Interestingly enough, the actions taken by the policy maker undergo marked qualitative changes as a function of the prevailing heterogeneity among and learning characteristics of the private agents.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.

Volume (Year): 34 (2010)
Issue (Month): 9 (September)
Pages: 1768-1790

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Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:34:y:2010:i:9:p:1768-1790

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jedc

Related research

Keywords: Time inconsistency Bounded rationality Forecast and agent heterogeneity Cheap talk Evolutionary learning;

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References

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  1. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, December.
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  3. Francisco Álvarez González & Christophe Deissenberg, 2001. "Cheating for the common good in a Macroeconomic policy game," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE 0104, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico.
  4. William Poole, 2002. "Flation," Speech 49, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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  6. Brock, William A. & Hommes, Cars H., 1998. "Heterogeneous beliefs and routes to chaos in a simple asset pricing model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 22(8-9), pages 1235-1274, August.
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  16. Stein, Jeremy C, 1989. "Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 32-42, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Mauro Napoletano & Jean-Luc Gaffard & Zakaria Babutsidze, 2012. "Agent Based Models A New Tool for Economic and Policy Analysis: A New Tool for Economic and Policy Analysis," Sciences Po publications 3, Sciences Po.
  2. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/53r60a8s3kup1vc9l5643ehjk is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Giorgio Fagiolo & Andrea Roventini, 2012. "Macroeconomic Policy in DSGE and Agent-Based Models," EconomiX Working Papers 2012-17, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
  4. Jasmina ARIFOVIC & Murat YILDIZOGLU, 2014. "Learning the Ramsey outcome in a Kydland & Prescott economy," Cahiers du GREThA 2014-06, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.

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