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Learning Benevolent Leadership in a Heterogenous Agents Economy

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Author Info

  • Jasmina Arifovic

    ()
    (Department of economics - Simon Fraser University)

  • Herbert Dawid

    ()
    (Dept. of Business Administration - Bielefeld University)

  • Christophe Deissenberg

    ()
    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579)

  • Olena Kostyshyna

    ()
    (Portland State University - Portland State University)

Abstract

This paper studies the potential commitment value of cheap talkinflation announcements in an agent-based dynamic extension of theKydland-Prescott model. In every period, the policy maker makesa non-binding inflation announcement before setting the actualinflation rate. It updates its decisions using individual evolutionarylearning. The private agents can choose between two differentforecasting strategies: They can either set their forecast equal tothe announcement or compute it, at a cost, using an adaptive learningscheme. They switch between these two strategies as a function ofinformation about the associated payoffs they obtain throughword-of-mouth, choosing always the currently most favorable one.Weshow that the policy maker is able to sustain a situation with apositive but fluctuating fraction of believers. This equilibrium isPareto superior to the outcome predicted by standard theory. Theinfluence of changes in key parameters and the impact of transmissionof information among nonbelievers on the dynamics are studied.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00339761.

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Date of creation: 18 Nov 2008
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00339761

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Related research

Keywords: time inconsistency; bounded rationality; forecast and agentheterogeneity; cheap talk; evolutionary learning;

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References

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  1. Honkapohja, Seppo & Mitra, Kaushik, 2002. "Performance of monetary policy with internal central bank forecasting," Working Paper Series 0127, European Central Bank.
  2. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  3. Evans, George W & Ramey, Garey, 1992. "Expectation Calculation and Macroeconomic Dynamics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 207-24, March.
  4. Wiliam Branch & George W. Evans, 2005. "Model Uncertainty and Endogenous Volatility," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2005-21, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 26 Oct 2006.
  5. Seppo Honkapohja & Kaushik Mitra, 2006. "Learning Stability in Economies with Heterogeneous Agents," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(2), pages 284-309, April.
  6. Brock, W.A. & Hommes, C.H., 1996. "Hetergeneous Beliefs and Routes to Chaos in a Simple Asset Pricing Model," Working papers 9621, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  7. Walsh, Carl E, 1999. "Announcements, Inflation Targeting and Central Bank Incentives," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 66(262), pages 255-69, May.
  8. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
  9. Branch, William A. & Evans, George W., 2006. "Intrinsic heterogeneity in expectation formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 264-295, March.
  10. Brock, W.A., 1995. "A Rational Route to Randomness," Working papers 9530, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  11. In-Koo Cho & Noah Williams & Thomas J. Sargent, 2002. "Escaping Nash Inflation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 1-40.
  12. William Poole, 2002. "Flation," Speech 49, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  13. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, December.
  14. Herbert Dawid, 2005. "Long horizon versus short horizon planning in dynamic optimization problems with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 575-597, 04.
  15. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1993. "Designing institutions for monetary stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 53-84, December.
  16. Francisco Álvarez González & Christophe Deissenberg, 2001. "Cheating for the common good in a Macroeconomic policy game," Documentos del Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico 0104, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales.
  17. Evans, George W. & Ramey, Garey, 1998. "Calculation, Adaptation And Rational Expectations," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(02), pages 156-182, June.
  18. Berardi, Michele, 2007. "Heterogeneity and misspecifications in learning," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(10), pages 3203-3227, October.
  19. Chryssi Giannitsarou, 2003. "Heterogeneous Learning," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(4), pages 885-906, October.
  20. Stein, Jeremy C, 1989. "Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 32-42, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Mauro Napoletano & Jean-Luc Gaffard & Zakaria Babutsidze, 2012. "Agent Based Models A New Tool for Economic and Policy Analysis: A New Tool for Economic and Policy Analysis," Sciences Po publications 3, Sciences Po.
  2. Giorgio Fagiolo & Andrea Roventini, 2012. "Macroeconomic Policy in DSGE and Agent-Based Models," INET Research Notes 6, Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET).
  3. Jasmina ARIFOVIC & Murat YILDIZOGLU, 2014. "Learning the Ramsey outcome in a Kydland & Prescott economy," Cahiers du GREThA 2014-06, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.
  4. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/53r60a8s3kup1vc9l5643ehjk is not listed on IDEAS

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