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IMF, Democracy and Economic Development: Review and Critique

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  • Psofogiorgos, Nikolaos - Alexandros
  • Metaxas, Theodore

Abstract

IMF was established as a financial institution for the promotion of world trade and international financial stability of members. However, IMF focused on assistance to developing countries and transition economies and as a result seems to have political implications. Many studies suggest that IMF lending programs undermine the quality of democracy in the countries which make use of the institution's resources. This conventional idea is rooted in two basic assumptions: First, when negotiations are made, the doors are closed. Secondly, the IMF programs impose strict limits on political power of borrowers that may result in power distribution consequences. Other studies result in a positive relationship between IMF programs and democracy. Maybe the presence of an IMF loan itself doesn’t affect the democracy, but high loan reforms required have negative impact on democratic practices. This effect depends on the type of reforms that are required by the loan.

Suggested Citation

  • Psofogiorgos, Nikolaos - Alexandros & Metaxas, Theodore, 2017. "IMF, Democracy and Economic Development: Review and Critique," MPRA Paper 79403, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:79403
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    IMF; democracy; reforms; political implications;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

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