Do IMF and World Bank programs induce government crises? An empirical analysis
AbstractWe examine whether and under which circumstances World Bank projects and IMF programs affect the likelihood of major government crises. Using a sample of more than 90 developing countries over the period 1970-2002, we find that crises are on average more likely as a consequence of Bank and Fund involvement. While the effects of the IMF to some extent depend on the model specification, those of the World Bank are shown to be robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation. We also find that governments face an increasing risk to enter a crisis when they remain under an arrangement once the economy performs better. The (economic) conditions present when a new arrangement is initiated, however, do not affect the impact of Fund and Bank on the probability of a crisis. Finally, while crisis probability rises when a government turns to the IFIs itself, programs inherited by preceding governments do not affect the probability of a crisis.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich in its series KOF Working papers with number 08-200.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2008
Date of revision:
Political Crisis; International Financial Institutions;
Other versions of this item:
- Dreher, Axel & Gassebner, Martin, 2012. "Do IMF and World Bank Programs Induce Government Crises? An Empirical Analysis," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 66(02), pages 329-358, April.
- Dreher, Axel & Gassebner, Martin, 2008. "Do IMF and World Bank programs induce government crises An empirical analysis," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Zurich 2008 13, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
- P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-07-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-FMK-2008-07-20 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-PKE-2008-07-20 (Post Keynesian Economics)
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- Christoph Moser & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2011.
"Explaining IMF Lending Decisions after the Cold War,"
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11-279, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
- Christoph Moser & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2011. "Explaining IMF lending decisions after the Cold War," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 307-340, September.
- Aidt, Toke & Albornoz, Facundo & Gassebner, Martin, 2010.
"The Golden Halo and Political Transitions,"
Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Hannover 2010
48, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
- Martin Gassebner & Facundo Albornoz & Toke S. Aidt, 2012. "The Golden Hello and Political Transitions," KOF Working papers 12-316, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
- Toke, A.S. & Albornoz, F. & Gassebner, M., 2012. "The Golden Hello and Political Transitions," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1241, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Toke S. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz & Martin Gassebner, 2012. "The Golden Hello and Political Transitions," CESifo Working Paper Series 3957, CESifo Group Munich.
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