Do IMF and World Bank Programs Induce Government Crises? An Empirical Analysis
AbstractWe examine whether and under which circumstances World Bank projects and IMF programs affect the likelihood of major government crises. Using a sample of more than 90 developing countries over the period 1970-2002, we find that crises are on average more likely as a consequence of Bank and Fund involvement. While the effects of the IMF to some extent depend on the model specification, those of the World Bank are shown to be robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation. We also find that governments face an increasing risk to enter a crisis when they remain under an arrangement once the economy performs better. The (economic) conditions present when a new arrangement is initiated, however, do not affect the impact of Fund and Bank on the probability of a crisis. Finally, while crisis probability rises when a government turns to the IFIs itself, programs inherited by preceding governments do not affect the probability of a crisis.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal International Organization.
Volume (Year): 66 (2012)
Issue (Month): 02 (April)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: The Edinburgh Building, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 2RU UK
Fax: +44 (0)1223 325150
Web page: http://journals.cambridge.org/jid_INOProvider-Email:email@example.com
Other versions of this item:
- Dreher, Axel & Gassebner, Martin, 2008. "Do IMF and World Bank programs induce government crises An empirical analysis," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Zurich 2008 13, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
- Axel Dreher & Martin Gassebner, 2008. "Do IMF and World Bank programs induce government crises? An empirical analysis," KOF Working papers 08-200, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
- P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Aidt, Toke & Albornoz, Facundo & Gassebner, Martin, 2010.
"The Golden Halo and Political Transitions,"
Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Hannover 2010
48, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
- Toke, A.S. & Albornoz, F. & Gassebner, M., 2012. "The Golden Hello and Political Transitions," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1241, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Toke S. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz & Martin Gassebner, 2012. "The Golden Hello and Political Transitions," CESifo Working Paper Series 3957, CESifo Group Munich.
- Martin Gassebner & Facundo Albornoz & Toke S. Aidt, 2012. "The Golden Hello and Political Transitions," KOF Working papers 12-316, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
- Christoph Moser & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2011.
"Explaining IMF lending decisions after the Cold War,"
The Review of International Organizations,
Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 307-340, September.
- Christoph Moser & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2011. "Explaining IMF Lending Decisions after the Cold War," KOF Working papers 11-279, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Keith Waters).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.