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Does one word fit all? The asymmetric effects of central banks' communication policy

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  • Bennani, Hamza

Abstract

This paper provides an extension of Morris and Shin's (2002) model (Morris, S., Shin, H. S. (2002). Social value of public information. The American Economic Review, 92(5), 1521-1534.). It considers an "interpretation bias" of the public signal sent by central banks such as the ECB or the FED. It is shown that such a bias is detrimental and should be considered when central banks implement their communication policy.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57150/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 57150.

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Date of creation: 07 Jul 2014
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:57150

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Keywords: central bank communication; monetary policy; public information.;

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References

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  23. Hamza Bennani, 2013. "Does the ECB consider the persistence of inflation differentials?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(3), pages 2129-2139.
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