Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Public and Private Information in Monetary Policy Models

Contents:

Author Info

  • Hyun Song Shin
  • Jeffery D. Amato

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of public information in an economy where agents also have diverse private information. Since disclosures by central banks are an important source of public information, we are able to assess how the words of central bankers shape expectations, in addition to their actions. In an otherwise standard macro model, the disproportionate role of public information degrades the information value of economic outcomes, alters the welfare consequences of increased precision of public information and generates distinctive time series characteristics of some macro variables.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/Shin/PDF/marcon18.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Christopher F. Baum)
File Function: main text
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 with number 38.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf3:38

Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: http://comp-econ.org/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: differential information; strategic complementarities; monetary policy; inflation targeting;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2003. "What Is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 426-477, June.
  2. Kenneth Kasa, 1995. "Signal extraction and the propagation of business cycles," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 95-14, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  3. Woodford, Michael, 1999. "Optimal monetary policy inertia," CFS Working Paper Series 1999/09, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  4. Marc P. Giannoni & Michael Woodford, 2003. "Optimal Interest-Rate Rules: I. General Theory," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000384, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Joseph G. Pearlman & Thomas J. Sargent, 2005. "Knowing the Forecasts of Others," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 8(2), pages 480-497, April.
  6. Bomfim, Antulio N., 2001. "Measurement error in general equilibrium: the aggregate effects of noisy economic indicators," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 585-603, December.
  7. Adam, Klaus, 2003. "Optimal monetary policy with imperfect common knowledge," Working Paper Series 0223, European Central Bank.
  8. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
  9. Michael Woodford, 1999. "Optimal monetary policy inertia," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  10. Lars E. O. Svensson & Michael Woodford, 2003. "Implementing Optimal Policy through Inflation-Forecast Targeting," NBER Working Papers 9747, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
  12. Vestin, David, 2000. "Price-level Targeting versus Inflation Targeting in a Forward-looking Model," Working Paper Series 106, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
  13. Philippe Bacchetta & Eric van Wincoop, 2003. "Can Information Heterogeneity Explain the Exchange Rate Determination Puzzle?," Working Papers 03.02, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
  14. Ben S. Bernanke & Michael Woodford, 1997. "Inflation forecasts and monetary policy," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 653-686.
  15. Townsend, Robert M, 1983. "Forecasting the Forecasts of Others," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 546-88, August.
  16. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2003. "Monetary Policy and Real Stabilization," NBER Working Papers 9486, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Sims, Christopher A., 2003. "Implications of rational inattention," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 665-690, April.
  18. Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000553, www.najecon.org.
  19. Christian Hellwig, 2002. "Public Announcements, Adjustment Delays, and the Business Cycle (November 2002)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 208, UCLA Department of Economics.
  20. Samet, Dov, 1998. "Iterated Expectations and Common Priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 131-141, July.
  21. Shin, Hyun Song & Williamson, Timothy, 1996. "How Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 252-268, April.
  22. Michael Woodford, 2001. "Imperfect Common Knowledge and the Effects of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 8673, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sce:scecf3:38. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.