Learning, Generalization and the Perception of Information: an Experimental Study
AbstractThis article experimentally explores the way in which human agents learn how to process and manage new information. In an abstract setting, players should perform an everyday task: selecting information, making generalizations, distinguishing contexts. The tendency to generalize is common to all participants, but in a different way. Best players have a stringer tendency to generalise rules. A high score is, in fact, associated with low entropy for mistakes, that is with a tendency to repeat the same mistakes over and over. Though the repetition of mistakes might be considered a failure to properly employ feedback or a bias, it may instead turn out as a viable and successful procedure. This result is connected to the literature on learning.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 28007.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
behavioural entropy; cognitive economics; complexity; experiments; feedback; heuristics; learning;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-01-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-01-23 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2011-01-23 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-01-23 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-NEU-2011-01-23 (Neuroeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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