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Learning, expectations formation, and the pitfalls of optimal control monetary policy

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  • Orphanides, Athanasios
  • Williams, John C.

Abstract

The optimal control approach to monetary policy has garnered increased attention in recent years. Optimal control policies, however, are designed for the specific features of a particular model and therefore may not be robust to model misspecification. One important source of potential misspecification is how agents form expectations. Specifically, whether they know the complete structure of the model as assumed in rational expectations or learn using a forecasting model that they update based on incoming data. Simulations of an estimated model of the U.S. economy show that the optimal control policy derived under the assumption of rational expectations can perform poorly when agents learn. The optimal control approach can be made more robust to learning by deemphasizing the stabilization of real economic activity and interest rates relative to inflation in the central bank loss function. That is, robustness to learning provides an incentive to employ a "conservative" central banker. In contrast to optimal control policies, two types of simple monetary policy rules from the literature that have been found to be robust to model misspecification in other contexts are shown to be robust to learning.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Monetary Economics.

Volume (Year): 55 (2008)
Issue (Month): Supplement 1 (October)
Pages: S80-S96

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Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:55:y:2008:i:s1:p:s80-s96

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505566

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Keywords: Rational expectations Robust control Model uncertainty;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Paul Hubert, 2013. "ECB projections as a tool for understanding policy decisions," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2013-04, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
  2. Luisa Lambertini & Caterina Mendicino & Maria Teresa Punzi, 2011. "Leaning Against Boom-Bust Cycles in Credit and Housing Prices," Working Papers 201101, Center for Fiscal Policy, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne, revised Mar 2011.
  3. Orphanides, Athanasios, 2010. "Monetary Policy Lessons from the Crisis," CEPR Discussion Papers 7891, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Mayer, Eric & Scharler, Johann, 2011. "Noisy information, interest rate shocks and the Great Moderation," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 568-581.
  5. Piotr Banbula & Witold Kozinski & Michal Rubaszek, 2011. "The role of the exchange rate in monetary policy in Poland," BIS Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Capital flows, commodity price movements and foreign exchange intervention, volume 57, pages 285-295 Bank for International Settlements.
  6. Paul Hubert, 2013. "ECB projections as a tool for understanding policy decisions," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2013-04, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
  7. Tsvetomira Tsenova, 2014. "International monetary transmission with bank heterogeneity and default risk," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 217-241, May.

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