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Political Alternation as a Restraint on Investing in Influence: Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition

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  • Milanovic, Branko
  • Hoff, Karla
  • Horowitz, Shale

Abstract

We develop and implement a method for measuring the frequency of changes in power among distinct leaders and ideologically distinct parties that is comparable across political systems. We find that more frequent alternation in power is associated with the emergence of better governance in postcommunist countries. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms seek durable protection from the state, which implies that expected political alternation is relevant to the decision whether to invest in influence with the governing party or, alternatively, to demand institutions that apply predictable rules, with equality of treatment, regardless of the party in power.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 11829.

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Date of creation: 30 Aug 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:11829

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Keywords: Governance; transition; political alternation;

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  1. Besley, Timothy J. & Burgess, Robin, 2001. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2721, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Lederman, Daniel & Loayza, Norman & Reis Soares, Rodrigo, 2001. "Accountability and corruption : political institutions matter," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2708, The World Bank.
  3. Irina Slinko & Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia," Economics Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science 0046, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  4. James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik & Thierry Verdier, 2003. "Politcal Foundations of the Resource Curse," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) 2003-33, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  5. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1975. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective," NBER Working Papers 0110, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Serguey Braguinsky, 2009. "Postcommunist Oligarchs in Russia: Quantitative Analysis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(2), pages 307-349, 05.
  7. Karla Hoff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2002. "After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies," NBER Working Papers 9282, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Avinash Dixit & Gene M. Grossman & Faruk Gul, 2000. "The Dynamics of Political Compromise," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(3), pages 531-568, June.
  9. Gradstein, Mark & Milanovic, Branko & Ying, Yvonne, 2001. "Democracy and income inequality : an empirical analysis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2561, The World Bank.
  10. Robert H. Bates, 2004. "On The Politics of Property Rights by Haber, Razo, and Maurer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 494-500, June.
  11. Hellman, Joel S. & Jones, Geraint & Kaufmann, Daniel, 2003. "Seize the state, seize the day: state capture and influence in transition economies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 751-773, December.
  12. Murshed, S. Mansoob, 2004. "When Does Natural Resource Abundance Lead to a Resource Curse?," Discussion Papers, International Institute for Environment and Development, Environmental Economics Programme 24137, International Institute for Environment and Development, Environmental Economics Programme.
  13. Yingyi Qian, 1999. "The Institutional Foundations of China's Market Transition," Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics 99011, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
  1. Campos, Nauro F & Giovannoni, Francesco, 2008. "Lobbying, Corruption and Other Banes," IZA Discussion Papers 3693, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Nauro Campos & Francesco Giovannoni, 2007. "Lobbying, corruption and political influence," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 1-21, April.
  3. Beck, T.H.L. & Laeven, L., 2006. "Institution building and growth in transition economies," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-4295080, Tilburg University.

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