IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ecopol/v22y2010i3p329-361.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Turnover In Power As A Restraint On Investing In Influence: Evidence From The Postcommunist Transition

Author

Listed:
  • BRANKO MILANOVIC
  • KARLA HOFF
  • SHALE HOROWITZ

Abstract

We develop and implement a method for measuring the frequency of changes in power among distinct leaders and ideologically distinct parties that is comparable across political systems. We find that in the postcommunist countries, more frequent changes in power in the early years of transition are associated with better governance in the later years. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that more frequent turnover in power lowers the returns to firms seeking to buy political influence: i.e. that government turnover serves as a restraint on investing in influence regardless of the ideology of the government.

Suggested Citation

  • Branko Milanovic & Karla Hoff & Shale Horowitz, 2010. "Turnover In Power As A Restraint On Investing In Influence: Evidence From The Postcommunist Transition," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 329-361, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:22:y:2010:i:3:p:329-361
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2010.00365.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2010.00365.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2010.00365.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Filipe R. Campante & Davin Chor & Quoc‐Anh Do, 2009. "Instability And The Incentives For Corruption," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 42-92, March.
    2. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/o45fqtltm960r11iq437ski90 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Karla Hoff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2004. "After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 753-763, June.
    4. Nauro Campos & Francesco Giovannoni, 2007. "Lobbying, corruption and political influence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 1-21, April.
    5. Thorsten Beck & Luc Laeven, 2006. "Institution building and growth in transition economies," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 157-186, June.
    6. Irina Slinko & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya & Evgeny Yakovlev, 2005. "Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 7(1), pages 284-318.
    7. Daniel Lederman & Norman V. Loayza & Rodrigo R. Soares, 2005. "Accountability And Corruption: Political Institutions Matter," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17, pages 1-35, March.
    8. Avinash Dixit & Gene M. Grossman & Faruk Gul, 2000. "The Dynamics of Political Compromise," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(3), pages 531-568, June.
    9. Robert H. Bates, 2004. "On The Politics of Property Rights by Haber, Razo, and Maurer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 494-500, June.
    10. Varese, Federico, 2001. "The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198297369.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & Feri, Francesco & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2021. "Institutional flexibility, political alternation, and middle-of-the-road policies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    2. Hélène Laurent, 2021. "Corruption and politicians’ horizon," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 65-91, March.
    3. Mihály Fazekas & Johannes Wachs, 2020. "Corruption and the Network Structure of Public Contracting Markets across Government Change," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 8(2), pages 153-166.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Milanovic, Branko & Hoff, Karla & Horowitz, Shale, 2008. "Political alternation as a restraint on investing in influence : evidence from the post-communist transition," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4747, The World Bank.
    2. Aisha Ismail & Kashif Rashid, 2014. "Time series analysis of the nexus among corruption, political instability and judicial inefficiency in Pakistan," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 48(5), pages 2757-2771, September.
    3. Irvin Mikhail Soto & Willy Walter Cortéz, 2015. "La corrupción en la burocracia estatal mexicana," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 17(33), pages 161-182, July-Dece.
    4. Eugen Dimant & Guglielmo Tosato, 2018. "Causes And Effects Of Corruption: What Has Past Decade'S Empirical Research Taught Us? A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 335-356, April.
    5. Irina Denisova & Markus Eller & Timothy Frye & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2007. "Who Wants to Revise Privatization and Why? Evidence from 28 Post-Communist Countries," Working Papers w0105, New Economic School (NES).
    6. Karla Hoff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2008. "Exiting a Lawless State," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(531), pages 1474-1497, August.
    7. Leonid Polishchuk & Georgiy Syunyaev, 2015. "Ruling elites’ rotation and asset ownership: implications for property rights," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(1), pages 159-182, January.
    8. Sergei Guriev & Andrei Rachinsky, 2006. "The Evolution of Personal Wealth in the Former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe," WIDER Working Paper Series RP2006-120, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    9. Stephan Huber, 2018. "Trade Patterns and Endogenous Institutions: Global Evidence," Contributions to Economics, in: Product Characteristics in International Economics, chapter 0, pages 91-120, Springer.
    10. Gans-Morse, Jordan & Borges, Mariana & Makarin, Alexey & Mannah-Blankson, Theresa & Nickow, Andre & Zhang, Dong, 2018. "Reducing bureaucratic corruption: Interdisciplinary perspectives on what works," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 171-188.
    11. Askarov, Zohid & Doucouliagos, Hristos, 2015. "Aid and institutions in transition economies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 55-70.
    12. Roger Myerson & Serguey Braguinsky, 2005. "Oligarchic Property Rights and Investment," 2005 Meeting Papers 49, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    13. William Pyle & Laura Solanko, 2013. "The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization”," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 19-41, April.
    14. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2011. "Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1274-1311, June.
    15. Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2007. "Whither Russia? A Review of Andrei Shleifer's A Normal Country," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(1), pages 127-146, March.
    16. John R. Hudson, 2011. "Conflict and Corruption," Chapters, in: Derek L. Braddon & Keith Hartley (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Conflict, chapter 8, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    17. Alexander Libman, 2006. "Government-Business Relations and Catching Up Reforms in the CIS," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 3(2), pages 263-288, December.
    18. Peter Grajzl & Peter Murrell, 2009. "Fostering civil society to build institutions Why and when1," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 17(1), pages 1-41, January.
    19. Marta Spreafico, 2013. "Institutions, the resource curse and the transition economies: further evidence," DISCE - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Politica Economica ispe0064, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    20. Rahmouni, Mohieddine, 2023. "Corruption and corporate innovation in Tunisia during an economic downturn," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 314-326.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:22:y:2010:i:3:p:329-361. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0954-1985 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.