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After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies

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Karla Hoff
Joseph E. Stiglitz

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Abstract

When Russia launched mass privatization, it was widely believed that it would create a powerful constituency for the rule of law. That didn't happen. We present a dynamic equilibrium model of the political demand for the rule of law and show that beneficiaries of mass privatization may fail to demand the rule of law even if it is the Pareto efficient rule of the game.' The reason is that uncertainty about the legal regime can lead to asset stripping, and stripping can give agents an interest in prolonging the absence of the rule of law.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 9282.

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Date of creation: Oct 2002
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9282

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P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy

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