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The Determinants of Asset Stripping: Theory and Evidence from the Transition Economies

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Author Info
Campos, Nauro F
Giovannoni, Francesco

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Abstract

During the transition from plan to market, managers and politicians succeeded in maintaining control of large parts of the stock of socialist physical capital. Despite the obvious importance of this phenomenon, there have been no efforts to model, measure and investigate this process empirically. This paper tries to fill this gap by putting forward theory and econometric evidence. We argue that asset stripping is driven by the interplay between the firm's potential profitability and its ability to influence law enforcement. Our econometric results, for about 950 firms in five transition economies, provide support for this argument.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 5215.

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Date of creation: Sep 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5215

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Related research
Keywords: asset stripping; corruption; law enforcement; transition;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H82 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Property
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
P31 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. J. Stiglitz, . "Whither Reform? Ten Years of the Transition," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki".
  2. Cull, Robert & Matesova, Jana & Shirley, Mary, 2002. "Ownership and the Temptation to Loot: Evidence from Privatized Firms in the Czech Republic," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-24, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Simon Johnson et al., 2000. "Tunneling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 22-27, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. repec:pal:imfstp:v:48:y:2001:i:4:p:6 is not listed on IDEAS
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  5. Roland, Gerard & Verdier, Thierry, 2003. "Law enforcement and transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 669-685, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Aaron Tornell & Philip R. Lane, 1999. "The Voracity Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 22-46, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Nauro F. Campos & Fabrizio Coricelli, 2002. "Growth in Transition: What We Know, What We Don't, and What We Should," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(3), pages 793-836, September.
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  8. Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Understanding Economic Policy Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 9-41, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Olivier Blanchard & Michael Kremer, 1997. "Disorganization," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 38, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Simon Johnson & John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, 2002. "Property Rights and Finance," NBER Working Papers 8852, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Konstantin Sonin, 2003. "Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights," Working Papers w0022, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
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  12. Hoff, Karla & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2002. "After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post-communist societies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2934, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Nauro Campos & Francesco Giovannoni, 2007. "Lobbying, corruption and political influence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 1-21, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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