The Determinants of Asset Stripping: Theory and Evidence from the Transition Economies

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The Determinants of Asset Stripping: Theory and Evidence from the Transition Economies

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Campos, Nauro F
Giovannoni, Francesco

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Nauro F. Campos

Abstract

During the transition from plan to market, managers and politicians succeeded in maintaining control of large parts of the stock of socialist physical capital. Despite the obvious importance of this phenomenon, there have been no efforts to model, measure, and investigate this process empirically. This paper tries to fill this gap by putting forward theory and econometric evidence. We argue that asset stripping is driven by the interplay between the firm's potential profitability and its ability to influence law enforcement. Our econometric results, for about 950 firms in five transition economies, provide support for this argument.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 49 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 681-706
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:y:2006:v:49:i:2:p:681-706

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Paper
- Nauro F. Campos & Francesco Giovannoni, 2005. "The Determinants of Asset Stripping: Theory and Evidence from the Transition Economies," IZA Discussion Papers 1867, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
- Nauro F. Campos & Francesco Giovannoni, 2005. "The Determinants of Asset Stripping: Theory and Evidence From the Transition Economies," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp786, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
- Campos, Nauro F & Giovannoni, Francesco, 2005. "The Determinants of Asset Stripping: Theory and Evidence from the Transition Economies," CEPR Discussion Papers 5215, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

J. Stiglitz, . "Whither Reform? Ten Years of the Transition," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki".
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Nauro F. Campos & Fabrizio Coricelli, 2002. "Growth in Transition: What We Know, What We Don't, and What We Should," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 470, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Campos, Nauro F & Coricelli, Fabrizio, 2002. "Growth in Transition: What we Know, What we Don't and What we Should," CEPR Discussion Papers 3246, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Nauro F. Campos & Fabrizio Coricelli, 2002. "Growth in Transition: What We Know, What We Don't, and What We Should," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(3), pages 793-836, September.
Simon Johnson et al., 2000. "Tunneling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 22-27, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
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Other versions:
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- Karla Hoff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2002. "After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies," NBER Working Papers 9282, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Other versions:
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Olivier Blanchard & Michael Kremer, 1997. "Disorganization," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 38, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Blanchard, O & Kremer, M, 1996. "Disorganization," Working papers 96-30, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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Simon Johnson & John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, 2002. "Property Rights and Finance," NBER Working Papers 8852, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Simon Johnson & John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, 2002. "Property Rights and Finance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1335-1356, December. [Downloadable!]
Konstantin Sonin, 2003. "Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights," Working Papers w0022, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Konstantin Sonin, 2002. "Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 544, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
- Sonin, Konstantin, 2003. "Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 715-731, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Nauro Campos & Francesco Giovannoni, 2007. "Lobbying, corruption and political influence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 1-21, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Nauro F. Campos & Francesco Giovannoni, 2006. "Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence," CEDI Discussion Paper Series 06-14, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University. [Downloadable!]
- Nauro F. Campos & Francesco Giovannoni, 2006. "Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence," IZA Discussion Papers 2313, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
- Campos, Nauro F & Giovannoni, Francesco, 2006. "Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence," CEPR Discussion Papers 5886, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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