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The Creation of the Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Property Rights: The Political and Economic Consequences of a Corrupt Privatization

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  • Karla Hoff
  • Joseph E. Stiglitz

Abstract

How does the lack of legitimacy of property rights affect the dynamics of the creation of the rule of law? We investigate the demand for the rule of law in post-Communist economies after privatization under the assumption that theft is possible, that those who have "stolen" assets cannot be fully protected under a change in the legal regime towards rule of law, and that the number of agents with control rights over assets is large. We show that a demand for broadly beneficial legal reform may not emerge because the expectation of weak legal institutions increases the expected relative return to stripping assets, and strippers may gain from a weak and corrupt state. The outcome can be inefficient even from the narrow perspective of the asset-strippers.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 11772.

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Date of creation: Nov 2005
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11772

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  1. Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, 2002. "The Corporate Governance Role of the Media," NBER Working Papers 9309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Karla Hoff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2002. "After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies," NBER Working Papers 9282, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Kaufmann, Daniel & Wei, Shang-Jin, 1999. "Does 'Grease Money' Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?," MPRA Paper 8209, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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  7. Daron Acemoglu, 1993. "Reward Structures and the Allocation of Talent," CEP Discussion Papers dp0143, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  8. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
  9. Kolodko, Grzegorz W., 2000. "From Shock to Therapy: The Political Economy of Postsocialist Transformation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780198297437, October.
  10. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1993. "Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 409-14, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Raynouard, Arnaud & Kerhuel, Anne-Julie, 2011. "Measuring the law: Sécurité juridique as a watermark," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/11683, Paris Dauphine University.
  2. David Martimort & Stephane Straub, 2006. "Privatization and Changes in Corruption Patterns: The Roots of Public Discontent," ESE Discussion Papers, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh 147, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  3. Enrico Colombatto, 2007. "It was the rule of law. Will it be the rule of judges?," ICER Working Papers, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research 41-2007, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  4. Bruno, Randolph Luca, 2008. "Rule of Law, Institutional Quality and Information," IZA Discussion Papers 3497, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Stefano Porcelli, 2009. "Civilian Tradition and the Chinese Company Law," Transition Studies Review, Springer, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 438-449, June.
  6. Davis, Junior, 2006. "Learning from local economic development experiences: Observations on Integrated Development Programmes of the Free State, Republic of South Africa," MPRA Paper 26045, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Martimort, David & Straub, Stéphane, 2009. "Infrastructure privatization and changes in corruption patterns: The roots of public discontent," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 69-84, September.

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