It was the rule of law. Will it be the rule of judges?
AbstractThe Gregorian revolution introduced the rule of law in the West and created necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for growth to take off. This paper analyzes some of the consequences provoked by the evolution in the notion of the rule of law – from being based upon God-given natural law to relying on popular sovereignty. It concludes that the importance of the rule of law, of the differences in legal systems and of constitutions is probably overstated. It suggests that the successor to the medieval notion of the rule of law is in fact a mix of procedural political correctness, social preferences and efficiency. As a result the main player becomes the judiciary, whose behavioral patterns should become the object of further analysis.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ICER - International Centre for Economic Research in its series ICER Working Papers with number 41-2007.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2007
Date of revision:
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