The Economic Effects of Judicial Accountability. Some Preliminary Insights
AbstractJudicial independence is not only a necessary condition for the impartiality of judges, it can also endanger it: judges that are independent could have incentives to remain uninformed, become lazy or even corrupt. It is therefore often argued that judicial independence and judicial accountability are competing ends. In this paper, it is, however, hypothesized that they are not necessarily competing ends but can be complementary means towards achieving impartiality and, in turn, the rule of law. It is further argued that judicial accountability can increase per capita income through various channels one of which is the reduction of corruption. First tests concerning the economic effects of JA are carried out drawing on the absence of corruption within the judiciary as well as data gathered by the U.S. State Department as proxies. On the basis of 75 countries, these proxies are highly significant for explaining differences in per capita income.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ICER - International Centre for Economic Research in its series ICER Working Papers with number 19-2005.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2005
Date of revision:
Judicial Independence; judicial accountability; rule of law; economic growth; corruption; constitutional political economy.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
- O40 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
- P51 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
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- NEP-ALL-2005-09-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2005-09-17 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2005-09-17 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2005-09-17 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-REG-2005-09-17 (Regulation)
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- Stefan Voigt & Lorenz Blume, .
"Wenn Justitia die Hand aufhält – Ursachen und Folgen korrupter Justizbehörden,"
German Working Papers in Law and Economics
2005-1-1133, Berkeley Electronic Press.
- Stefan Voigt & Lorenz Blume, 2007. "Wenn Justitia die Hand aufhält - Ursachen und Folgen korrupter Justizbehörden," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 8(1), pages 65-92, 01.
- Enrico Colombatto, 2007. "It was the rule of law. Will it be the rule of judges?," ICER Working Papers 41-2007, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
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