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Governance Redux: The Empirircal Challenge

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  • Daniel Kaufmann

    (World Bank Institute)

Abstract

This paper is based on the governance chapter contribution to the 2003/04 Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). Building from the 2002/03 contribution to the GCR, it argues that governance continues to be at a crossroad, its underperformance being evident worldwide in most regions and across many countries. This ('governance policy gap') contrasts with the strides that have been made in many countries in improving macro- economic policies for well over a decade. Based on a worldwide survey of enterprises carried out for the GCR, we find that firms from emerging economies single out corruption and excessive bureaucracy among the top constraints to their business operations, while excessive bureaucracy and the tax regime are identified as top constraints by the respondent firms from the OECD. Many countries currently have levels of governance that are insufficient to support their income levels and/or growth path, namely they experience a 'governance deficit', which can be quantified. We also carry out a simple empirical exploration challenging the validity of legal-historical origins in determining governance performance in emerging economies nowadays, and provide a brief synthesis of the empirical importance of inequality of influence (by vested interests), as well as of governance at the city level.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Law and Economics with number 0405001.

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Date of creation: 14 May 2004
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0405001

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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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Keywords: Governance Competitiveness; Corruption; Business Survey; Influence;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Steven Globerman & Daniel Shapiro, 2004. "Assessing International Mergers And Acquisitions As A Mode Of Foreign Direct Investment," International Finance 0404009, EconWPA.
  2. Haggard, Stephan & Tiede, Lydia, 2011. "The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: Where are We?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 673-685, May.
  3. Axel Dreher & Martin Gassebner & Lars-H. R. Siemers, 2007. "Does Terror Threaten Human Rights? Evidence from Panel Data," CESifo Working Paper Series 1935, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Andvig, Jens Chr., 2006. "Corruption and fast change," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 328-340, February.

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