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How export shocks corrupt: theory and evidence

Author

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  • Joël Cariolle

    (FERDI - Fondation pour les Etudes et Recherches sur le Développement International)

  • Petros G Sekeris

    (Groupe Sup de Co Montpellier (GSCM) - Montpellier Business School)

Abstract

In this article we uncover a positive effect of both export booms and busts on firm-level corruption. Our theory underlines the central role played by human capital in the underlying mechanism. In low human capital settings, export-related revenues are highly elastic to incremental gains of export shares, thence pushing firms to intensify corruption with export busts so as to avoid a radical drop in their revenues. In high human capital settings, export booms lead to more corruption as an increment of export share achieved through bribery concerns a large export market. We corroborate these findings with an extensive database of some 45,000 firms from 72 developing and transition economies, surveyed over 2006-2017. Besides confirming that export booms and busts corrupt and highlighting the mediating role of human capital, we also highlight the corruption-deterrent effect institutions during export market expansion and contraction.

Suggested Citation

  • Joël Cariolle & Petros G Sekeris, 2021. "How export shocks corrupt: theory and evidence," Working Papers hal-03164648, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03164648
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    Cited by:

    1. Phan, Trang Hoai & Stachuletz, Rainer, 2022. "Bribery—Export Nexus under the Firm’s Growth Obstacles," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) 132144, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
    2. Trang Hoai Phan & Rainer Stachuletz, 2022. "Bribery—Export Nexus under the Firm’s Growth Obstacles," Economies, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-26, January.

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    Keywords

    Corruption; Bribery; Export shocks; Human capital;
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