How Petty is Petty Corruption? Evidence from Firm Surveys in Africa
AbstractSummary Evidence suggests that corruption is costly for African firms. This paper, however, shows that a minor difference in the way the question on bribe payments is asked has a large effect on estimates of the size of the burden. On average, firms report payments that are between 4 and 15 times higher when they report them as a percent of sales than when they report them in monetary terms. The paper discusses several possible reasons for this, but none explain the difference. One plausible remaining reason is that firm managers overestimate bribes when they report them in percentage terms.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal World Development.
Volume (Year): 39 (2011)
Issue (Month): 7 (July)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev
Africa Tanzania corruption firm surveys investment climate;
Other versions of this item:
- Clarke, George, 2008. "How petty is petty corruption? Evidence from firm survey in Africa," MPRA Paper 15073, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Aug 2008.
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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