Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from US States
Abstract
We show that isolated capital cities are robustly associated with greater levels of corruption across US states. In particular, this is the case when we use the variation induced by the exogenous location of a state's centroid to instrument for the concentration of population around the capital city. We then show that different mechanisms for holding state politicians accountable are also affected by the spatial distribution of population: newspapers provide greater coverage of state politics when their audiences are more concentrated around the capital, and voter turnout in state elections is greater in places that are closer to the capital. Consistent with lower accountability, there is also evidence that there is more money in state-level political campaigns in those states with isolated capitals. We find that the role of media accountability helps explain the connection between isolated capitals and corruption. In addition, we provide some evidence that this pattern is also associated with lower levels of public good spending and outcomes.Download Info
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Paper provided by Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government in its series Working Paper Series with number rwp12-016.Length:
Date of creation: May 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp12-016
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Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Filipe R. Campante & Quoc-Anh Do, 2012. "Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from US States," Working Papers 21-2012, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
- R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)
- R50 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2012-06-13 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2012-06-13 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-SEA-2012-06-13 (South East Asia)
- NEP-URE-2012-06-13 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Campante, Filipe R. & Do, Quoc-Anh & Guimaraes, Bernardo, 2012.
"Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence,"
Working Paper Series
rwp12-058, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Campante, Filipe & Do, Quoc-Anh & Guimarães, Bernardo, 2013. "Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 9284, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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