The Sotheby`s/Christie`s price-fixing scandal that ended in the public trial of Alfred Taubman provides a unique window on a number of key economic and antitrust policy issues related to the use of the auction system. The trial provided detailed evidence as to how the price fixing worked, and the economic conditions under which it was started and began to fall apart. The outcome of the case also provides evidence on the novel auction process used to choose the lead counsel for the civil settlement. Finally, though buyers received the bulk of the damages, a straightforward application of the economic theory of auctions shows that it is unlikely that successful buyers as a group were injured.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number
203.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002.
"What Determines Cartel Success?,"
Working Papers
2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
GINSBURGH, Victor & LEGROS, Patrick & SAHUGUET, Nicolas, 2005.
"How to win twice at an auction,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2005005, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!]
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)