Recent game-theoretic studies of the effects of the business cycle on oligopoly coordination predict that coordination is weakest when demand is high and expected future profit is lower. An empirical model that uses a conjectural elasticity term to measure the degree of coordination is developed to test for these two effects. The rayon industry of the 1930s is one that exhibited significantly non-competitive condudct that appears to have varied, in degree, with fluctuations in demand. Application of the empirical model to data from this industry produces results that support the predictions of recent theoretical models.
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Paper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number
5250.
Length: Date of creation: 01 Mar 2002 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in Review of Industrial Organization, April 1995, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 181-196. Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:5250
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Find related papers by JEL classification: L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
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Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002.
"What Determines Cartel Success?,"
Working Papers
2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
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