Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby's and Christie's
AbstractThe Sotheby's/Christie's price-fixing scandal that ended in the public trial of Alfred Taubman provides a unique window on a number of key economic and antitrust policy issues related to the use of the auction system. The trial provided detailed evidence as to how the price fixing worked, and the economic conditions under which it was started and began to fall apart. The outcome of the case also provides evidence on the novel auction process used to choose the lead counsel for the civil settlement. Finally, though buyers received the bulk of the damages, a straightforward application of the economic theory of auctions shows that it is unlikely that successful buyers as a group were injured.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10795.
Date of creation: Sep 2004
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Publication status: published as Ashenfelter, Orley and Kathryn Graddy. "Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby's and Christies's." Journal of Competition Law & Economic 1, 1 (March 2005).
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- Kathryn Graddy & Orley Ashenfelter, 2004. "Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby`s and Christie`s," Economics Series Working Papers 203, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Ashenfelter, Orley C & Graddy, Kathryn, 2004. "Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby's and Christie's," CEPR Discussion Papers 4662, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Orley Ashenfelter & Kathryn Graddy, 2004. "Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby’s and Christie’s," Working Papers 100, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-09-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2004-09-30 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-HIS-2004-09-30 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-LAW-2004-09-30 (Law & Economics)
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