How to win twice at an auction. On the incidence of commissions in auction markets
AbstractWe analyze the welfare consequences of an increase in the commissions charged by intermediaries in auction markets. We argue that while commissions are similar to taxes imposed on buyers and sellers the question of incidence deserves a new treatment in auction markets. We show that an increase in commissions makes sellers worse off, but buyers may strictly gain. The results are therefore strikingly different from the standard result that all consumers weakly lose after a tax or a commission increase. Our results are useful for evaluating compensation in price fixing conspiracies; in particular they suggest that the method used to distribute compensations in the class action against auction houses Christie's and Sotheby' was misguided.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2005005.
Date of creation: 00 Feb 2005
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auction; intermediation; commissions; welfare;
Other versions of this item:
- Ginsburgh, Victor & Legros, Patrick & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2005. "How to Win Twice at an Auction: On the Incidence of Commissions in Auction Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 4876, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Victor Ginsburgh & Patrick Legros & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2004. "How to Win Twice at an Auction. On the Incidence of Commissions in Auction Markets," Working Papers 2004.146, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
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- Burguet, Roberto & Sakovics, Jozsef, 1999. "Imperfect Competition in Auction Designs," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 231-47, February.
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"Auctions and the Price of Art,"
Economics Series Working Papers
131, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
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- Michael R. Baye & John Morgan, 2001. "Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 454-474, June.
- Kathryn Graddy & Orley Ashenfelter, 2004.
"Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby`s and Christie`s,"
Economics Series Working Papers
203, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Orley Ashenfelter & Kathryn Graddy, 2004. "Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby’s and Christie’s," Working Papers 100, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
- Orley Ashenfelter & Kathryn Graddy, 2004. "Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby's and Christie's," NBER Working Papers 10795, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ashenfelter, Orley C & Graddy, Kathryn, 2004. "Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby's and Christie's," CEPR Discussion Papers 4662, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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