How to Win Twice at an Auction: On the Incidence of Commissions in Auction Markets
We analyse the welfare consequences of an increase in the commissions charged by intermediaries in auction markets. We argue that while commissions are similar to taxes imposed on buyers and sellers the question of incidence deserves a new treatment in auction markets. We show that an increase in commissions makes sellers worse off, but buyers may strictly gain. The results are therefore strikingly different from the standard result that all consumers weakly lose after a tax or a commission increase. Our results are useful for evaluating compensation in price fixing conspiracies; in particular they suggest that the method used to distribute compensations in the class action against auction houses Christie’s and Sotheby’s was misguided.
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- Kathryn Graddy & Orley Ashenfelter, 2002.
"Auctions and the Price of Art,"
Economics Series Working Papers
131, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Burguet, Roberto & Sakovics, Jozsef, 1999. "Imperfect Competition in Auction Designs," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 231-47, February.
- Michael R. Baye & John Morgan, 2001. "Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 454-474, June.
- Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1987. "On Optimal Reservation Prices in Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 33(6), pages 763-770, June.
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