This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Reservation Prices And Pre-Auction Estimates: A Study In Abstract Art

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Calin Valsan () (Bishop’s University, Lennoxville, Quebec)
Robert Sproule () (Bishop’s University, Lennoxville, Quebec)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Using a sample of European abstract art we show that reservation prices constrain pre-auction estimates in such a way that we are more likely to observe overestimation relative to the midpoint of the estimation window. At the same time, we also find that the low pre-auction estimate is a more powerful, accurate and precise predictor of hammer prices than the high estimate.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.amfiteatrueconomic.ase.ro/arhiva/pdf/no24/articol_fulltext_pag257.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Article provided by Academy of Economic Studies - Bucharest, Romania in its journal The AMFITEATRU ECONOMIC journal.

Volume (Year): 10 (2008)
Issue (Month): 24 (June)
Pages: 257-272
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:aes:amfeco:v:10:y:2008:i:24:p:257-272

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 6 ROMANA PLACE, 70167 - BUCHAREST
Phone: 0040-01-2112650
Fax: 0040-01-3129549
Email:
Web page: http://amfiteatrueconomic.ase.ro/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Gavrila Alexandru).

Related research
Keywords: Art Auctions; Abstract Art; Pre-auction Estimates; Reservation Price; Bias;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing
Z11 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economics of the Arts and Literature

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Orley Ashenfelter & Kathryn Graddy, 2004. "Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby's and Christie's," NBER Working Papers 10795, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Luc BAUWENS & Victor GINSBURGH, 2000. "Art experts and auctions Are pre-sale estimates unbiased and fully informative?," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2000022, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
  3. Chanel, O. & Gerard-Varet, L.A., 1996. "Auction Theory and Practice Evidence from the Market for Jewellery," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 96b05, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  4. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Michael Beckmann, 2004. "Why Do Sellers At Auctions Bid For Their Own Items? Theory And Evidence," Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 56(4), pages 312–337, October. [Downloadable!]
  6. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Alan Beggs & Kathryn Graddy, 1997. "Declining Values and the Afternoon Effect: Evidence from Art Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(3), pages 544-565, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Jianping Mei & Michael Moses, 2005. "Vested Interest and Biased Price Estimates: Evidence from an Auction Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(5), pages 2409-2435, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Graddy, Kathryn, 2006. "Art Auctions," Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture, Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer with RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-21.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.