How quorum rules distort referendum outcomes: evidence from a pivotal voter model
AbstractIn many jurisdictions, whether referendum results are binding depend on certain legally defined quorum requirements. With a pivotal-voter model, we examine how quorum requirements affect voter’s behavior. We conclude that quorums can be the cause of lower turnout and that they can deliver outcomes that are an inadequate basis to make inferences about collective preferences. We further conclude that quorums may help minorities to impose their will on majorities and that they may create a bias against the status quo. Finally, they generate situations under which the secrecy of the vote is called into question.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by NIPE - Universidade do Minho in its series NIPE Working Papers with number 17/2009.
Date of creation: 2009
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-09-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-09-11 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2009-09-11 (Positive Political Economics)
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