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The Potential of Direct Democracy: A Global Measure (1900–2014)

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  • David Altman

    (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)

Abstract

To what extent is direct democracy achieved in current polities? To answer this question, I develop an index, Direct Democracy Practice Potential, which is applied to 200 polities worldwide. This index results from the aggregation of the scores of four types of mechanisms of direct democracy: popular initiatives, popular referendums, obligatory referendums, and authorities’ plebiscites. This index measures: (1) how easy it is to initiate and approve each type of popular vote, and (2) how consequential that vote is (if approved). Ease of initiation is measured by: (a) the existence of a direct democracy process, (b) the number of signatures needed, and (c) time limits to collect signatures. Ease of approval is measured by quorums pertaining to: (a) participation, (b) approval, (c) supermajority, and (d) district majority. Regarding how consequential the vote is, it considers its decisiveness (whether the decision is binding), and the threat capability of citizen-initiated mechanisms of direct democracy as measured by the frequency with which direct popular votes have been used and approved in the past. Finally, the study tests the validity of the new measure, discussing its strengths and limitations.

Suggested Citation

  • David Altman, 2017. "The Potential of Direct Democracy: A Global Measure (1900–2014)," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 1207-1227, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:soinre:v:133:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11205-016-1408-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s11205-016-1408-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. François Maniquet & Massimo Morelli, 2015. "Approval quorums dominate participation quorums," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 1-27, June.
    2. Frey, Bruno S & Kucher, Marcel & Stutzer, Alois, 2001. "Outcome, Process and Power in Direct Democracy: New Econometric Results," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(3-4), pages 271-293, June.
    3. Paulo P. Côrte-Real & Paulo T. Pereira, 2004. "The voter who wasn’t there: Referenda, representation and abstention," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(2), pages 349-369, April.
    4. Aguiar-Conraria, Luís & Magalhães, Pedro C., 2010. "How quorum rules distort referendum outcomes: Evidence from a pivotal voter model," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 541-557, December.
    5. John Matsusaka, 2014. "Disentangling the direct and indirect effects of the initiative process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 345-366, September.
    6. Bruno S. Frey & Marcel Kucher & Alois Stutzer, "undated". "Outcome, Process & Power in Direct Democracy," IEW - Working Papers 025, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    7. Simon Hug & George Tsebelis, 2002. "Veto Players and Referendums Around the World," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 14(4), pages 465-515, October.
    8. Ece Özlem Atikcan, 2015. "The Puzzle of Double Referendums in the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(5), pages 937-956, September.
    9. Luís Aguiar-Conraria & Pedro Magalhães, 2010. "Referendum design, quorum rules and turnout," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 63-81, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Vicente Rios, 2020. "Does direct democracy matter for fiscal policy volatility?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(3), pages 2134-2142.

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