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Protection Reduction and Diversion: PTAs and the Incidence of Antidumping Disputes

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  • Thomas J. Prusa
  • Robert Teh

Abstract

We analyze whether preferential trade agreements (PTAs) affect the incidence and pattern of antidumping (AD) filings. We estimate AD provisions in PTAs have decreased the incidence of intra-PTA AD cases by 33-55% and have increased the number of AD actions against non-PTA members by 10-30%. The net effect of PTA rules on total AD filings is small. Our results are robust to alternative estimation approaches and controlling for a myriad of other PTA-related phenomena. Our results suggest a protection analogue to the “trade creation-trade diversion” impact of PTAs. PTA members are spared from AD actions but non-PTA members face even greater AD scrutiny.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 16276.

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Date of creation: Aug 2010
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16276

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References

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  1. Thomas Prusa & Michael Knetter, 2000. "Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Filings: Evidence from Four Countries," Departmental Working Papers 200023, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  2. Thomas J. Prusa, 1999. "On the Spread and Impact of Antidumping," NBER Working Papers 7404, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Feinberg, Robert M. & Hirsch, Barry T., 1989. "Industry rent seeking and the filing of unfair trade complaints," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 325-340.
  4. Thomas J. Prusa, 2005. "Anti-dumping: A Growing Problem in International Trade," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(5), pages 683-700, 05.
  5. Blonigen, Bruce A. & Bown, Chad P., 2003. "Antidumping and retaliation threats," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 249-273, August.
  6. Philippa Dee, 2006. "Multinational Corporations and Pacific Regionalism," Trade Working Papers 21836, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
  7. Bruce A. Blonigen & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "Antidumping," NBER Working Papers 8398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Theo S. Eicher & Christian Henn & Chris Papageorgiou, 2012. "Trade creation and diversion revisited: Accounting for model uncertainty and natural trading partner effects," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(2), pages 296-321, 03.
  9. Michael Moore & Alan Fox, 2010. "Why don’t foreign firms cooperate in US antidumping investigations? An empirical analysis," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 145(4), pages 597-613, January.
  10. Moore, Michael O, 1992. "Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of ITC Anti-dumping Decisions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(3), pages 449-66, July.
  11. Caroline L. Freund & John McLaren, 1999. "On the dynamics of trade diversion: evidence from four trade blocs," International Finance Discussion Papers 637, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  12. Feinberg, Robert M, 1989. "Exchange Rates and "Unfair Trade."," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 71(4), pages 704-07, November.
  13. Robert Baldwin & Jeffrey Steagall, 1994. "An analysis of ITC decisions in antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguard cases," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 130(2), pages 290-308, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Mavroidis, Petros C., 2011. "Always look at the bright side of non-delivery: WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements, yesterday and today," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(03), pages 375-387, July.
  2. Chad P. Bown & Baybars Karacaovali & Patricia Tovar, 2014. "What Do We Know About Preferential Trade Agreements and Temporary Trade Barriers?," Working Papers 201418, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  3. Ludema, Rodney D & Mayda, Anna Maria, 2011. "Canada: No Place Like Home for Antidumping," CEPR Discussion Papers 8389, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Bown, Chad P., 2013. "Trade policy flexibilities and Turkey : tariffs, antidumping, safeguards, and WTO dispute settlement," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6322, The World Bank.

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