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What do we know about preferential trade agreements and temporary trade barriers ?

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  • Bown, Chad P.
  • Karacaovali, Baybars
  • Tovar, Patricia

Abstract

Two of the most important trade policy developments to take place since the 1980s are the expansion of preferential trade agreements and temporary trade barriers, such as antidumping, safeguards, and countervailing duties. Despite the empirical importance of preferential trade agreements and temporary trade barriers and the common feature that each can independently have quite discriminatory elements, relatively little is known about the nature of any relationships between them. This paper surveys the literature on some of the political-economic issues that can arise at the intersection of preferential trade agreements and temporary trade barriers and uses four case studies to illustrate variation in how countries apply the World Trade Organization's global safeguards policy instrument. The four examples include recent policies applied by a variety of types of countries and under different agreements: large and small countries, high-income and emerging economies, and free trade areas and customs unions. The analysis reveals important measurement and identification challenges for research that seeks to find evidence of systematic relationships between the formation of preferential trade agreements, the political-economic implications of their implementation, and the use of subsequent temporary trade barriers.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 6898.

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Date of creation: 01 Jun 2014
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6898

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Keywords: Trade Law; Free Trade; Trade Policy; Currencies and Exchange Rates; Rules of Origin;

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  1. Bown, Chad P. & Crowley, Meredith A., 2012. "Import protection, business cycles, and exchange rates : evidence from the great recession," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank 6038, The World Bank.
  2. Antoni Estevadeordal & Caroline Freund & Emanuel Ornelas, 2008. "Does regionalism affect trade liberalization towards non-members?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library 19584, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  3. Christian Broda & Nuno Limao & David E. Weinstein, 2008. "Optimal Tariffs and Market Power: The Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 98(5), pages 2032-65, December.
  4. Karacaovali, Baybars & Limão, Nuno, 2008. "The clash of liberalizations: Preferential vs. multilateral trade liberalization in the European Union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 299-327, March.
  5. Thomas J. Prusa & Robert Teh, 2010. "Protection Reduction and Diversion: PTAs and the Incidence of Antidumping Disputes," NBER Working Papers 16276, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2006. "What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical Evidence from the World Trade Organization," NBER Working Papers 12727, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/8335 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Caroline Freund & Emanuel Ornelas, 2009. "Regional Trade Agreements," CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE dp0961, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  9. Nuno Limão & Patricia Tovar, 2009. "Policy Choice: Theory and Evidence from Commitment via International Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 14655, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Patrick A. Messerlin, 2004. "China in the World Trade Organization: Antidumping and Safeguards," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, World Bank Group, vol. 18(1), pages 105-130.
  11. Chad P. Bown, 2011. "The Great Recession and Import Protection : The Role of Temporary Trade Barriers," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 16359, August.
  12. Rodney D. Ludema & Anna Maria Mayda, 2013. "Do terms-of-trade effects matter for trade agreements? Theory and evidence from WTO Countries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 128(4), pages 1837-1893.
  13. Chad P. Bown, 2004. "How Different Are Safeguards from Antidumping? Evidence from US Trade Policies Toward Steel," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings, Econometric Society 434, Econometric Society.
  14. Arvind Panagariya, 2000. "Preferential Trade Liberalization: The Traditional Theory and New Developments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 38(2), pages 287-331, June.
  15. Joost Pauwelyn, 2004. "The Puzzle Of Wto Safeguards And Regional Trade Agreements," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 109-142, March.
  16. Chad P. Bown & Meredith A. Crowley, 2010. "China's export growth and the China safeguard: threats to the world trading system?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 43(4), pages 1353-1388, November.
  17. Bown, Chad P. & Tovar, Patricia, 2011. "Trade liberalization, antidumping, and safeguards: Evidence from India's tariff reform," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 115-125, September.
  18. Hylke Vandenbussche & Maurizio Zanardi, 2008. "What explains the proliferation of antidumping laws?," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 23, pages 93-138, 01.
  19. Bown, Chad P. & Crowley, Meredith A., 2010. "Self-enforcing trade agreements : evidence from time-varying trade policy," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank 5223, The World Bank.
  20. Patrick Messerlin, 2004. "China in the World Trade Organization: Antidumping and Safeguards," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/8335, Sciences Po.
  21. Chad P. Bown, 2007. "Canada's Anti-dumping and Safeguard Policies: Overt and Subtle Forms of Discrimination," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(9), pages 1457-1476, 09.
  22. Tovar, Patricia, 2012. "Preferential Trade Agreements and Unilateral Liberalization: Evidence from CAFTA," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(04), pages 591-619, October.
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