Why don’t foreign firms cooperate in US antidumping investigations? An empirical analysis
AbstractForeign firms face punitive duties if they do not cooperate with the US Department of Commerce (DOC) in antidumping procedures. For example, 37% of all foreign firms involved in antidumping investigations in the US chose faced âfacts availableâ margins for the 1995-2002 period, with average antidumping duties of 31% for cooperating foreign firms, compared to 87% for those who do not. The existing literature has focused on how DOC discretion has led to foreign firm non-cooperation. This paper instead examines individual foreign firmâs decisions about whether to cooperate during this same period. We find evidence that non-cooperation is consistent with a model of foreign firms rationally choosing not to cooperate, rather than solely as a result of investigating authority bias against imports.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of World Economics.
Volume (Year): 145 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (January)
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Other versions of this item:
- Michael Owen Moore & Alan Fox, 2008. "Why Don't Foreign Firms Cooperate in U.S. Antidumping Investigations?: An Emperical Analysis," Working Papers 2008-17, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
- F1 - International Economics - - Trade
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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