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Why don’t foreign firms cooperate in US antidumping investigations? An empirical analysis

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  • Michael Moore

    ()

  • Alan Fox

Abstract

Foreign firms face punitive duties if they do not cooperate with the US Department of Commerce (DOC) in antidumping procedures. For example, 37% of all foreign firms involved in antidumping investigations in the US chose faced “facts available” margins for the 1995-2002 period, with average antidumping duties of 31% for cooperating foreign firms, compared to 87% for those who do not. The existing literature has focused on how DOC discretion has led to foreign firm non-cooperation. This paper instead examines individual foreign firm’s decisions about whether to cooperate during this same period. We find evidence that non-cooperation is consistent with a model of foreign firms rationally choosing not to cooperate, rather than solely as a result of investigating authority bias against imports.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10290-009-0035-0
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of World Economics.

Volume (Year): 145 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (January)
Pages: 597-613

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Handle: RePEc:spr:weltar:v:145:y:2010:i:4:p:597-613

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Related research

Keywords: Antidumping; Facts-available; US trade policy; F10; F13; F14;

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References

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  1. Nelson, Douglas, 2006. "The political economy of antidumping: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 554-590, September.
  2. Moore, Michael O, 1992. "Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of ITC Anti-dumping Decisions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(3), pages 449-66, July.
  3. Bruce A. Blonigen, 2006. "Evolving discretionary practices of U.S. antidumping activity," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(3), pages 874-900, August.
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Cited by:
  1. Xenia Matschke & Anja Schöttner, 2013. "Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy under Asymmetric Information," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 81-105, July.
  2. Michael O. Moore, 2011. "Implementing Carbon Tariffs: A Fool’s Errand?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(10), pages 1679-1702, October.
  3. Moore, Michael O., 2006. "U.S. facts-available antidumping decisions: An empirical analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 639-652, September.
  4. Chad P. Bown, 2010. "China's WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute Settlement," NBER Chapters, in: China's Growing Role in World Trade, pages 281-337 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Thomas J. Prusa & Robert Teh, 2010. "Protection Reduction and Diversion: PTAs and the Incidence of Antidumping Disputes," NBER Working Papers 16276, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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