Job Assignment with Multivariate Skills
AbstractThis paper analyzes the job assignment problem faced by a firm when workers’ skills are distributed along several dimensions and jobs require different skills to varying extent. I derive optimal assignment rules with and without slot constraints, and show that under certain circumstances workers may get promoted although in their new job they are expected to be less productive than in their old job. This can be interpreted as a version of the Peter Principle which states that workers get promoted up to their level of incompetence.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in its series Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods with number 2010_25.
Date of creation: May 2010
Date of revision:
job assignment; worker selection; internal hiring; Peter Principle; slot constraints; multi-dimensional skills;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
- J0 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General
- J62 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Job, Occupational and Intergenerational Mobility; Promotion
- M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-09-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-HRM-2010-09-11 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LAB-2010-09-11 (Labour Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Michael Waldman, 2003. "Ex Ante versus Ex Post Optimal Promotion Rules: The Case of Internal Promotion," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(1), pages 27-41, January.
- Tor Eriksson & Jaime Ortega, 2006.
"The adoption of job rotation: Testing the theories,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 59(4), pages 653-666, July.
- Eriksson, Tor & Ortega, Jaime, 2004. "The Adoption of Job Rotation: Testing the Theories," Working Papers 04-3, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Edward P. Lazear, 2004. "The Peter Principle: A Theory of Decline," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(S1), pages S141-S163, February.
- Kate Antonovics & Limor Golan, .
"Experimentation and Job Choice,"
GSIA Working Papers
2006-E41, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Jed DeVaro & Hodaka Morita, 2013. "Internal Promotion and External Recruitment: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 227 - 269.
- Valsecchi, Irene, 2000.
" Job Assignment and Promotion,"
Journal of Economic Surveys,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 31-51, February.
- Christina Gathmann & Uta Schönberg, 2010.
"How General Is Human Capital? A Task-Based Approach,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 1-49, 01.
- Gathmann, Christina & Schönberg, Uta, 2007. "How General Is Human Capital? A Task-Based Approach," IZA Discussion Papers 3067, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Chan, William, 1996. "External Recruitment versus Internal Promotion," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(4), pages 555-70, October.
- Gibbons, Robert & Waldman, Michael, 2003.
"Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms,"
4324-03, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 2006. "Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics inside Firms," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 59-108, January.
- Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 2003. "Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms," NBER Working Papers 9849, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber & Theofanis Tsoulouhas, .
"Are Outsiders Handicapped in CEO Successions?,"
Working Paper Series
003, North Carolina State University, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2004.
- Sattinger, Michael, 1993. "Assignment Models of the Distribution of Earnings," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(2), pages 831-80, June.
- Jaime Ortega, 2001. "Job Rotation as a Learning Mechanism," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 47(10), pages 1361-1370, October.
- Joao Ricardo Faria, 2000. "An Economic Analysis of the Peter and Dilbert Principles," Working Paper Series 101, Finance Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marc Martin).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.