The probability that an unskilled worker can be successfully trained and or screened to be a manager depends on the effort of the firm. With positive hiring costs, a firm prefers to train/screen its own managers. However the optimal size of the firm for productive efficiency may conflict with efficient managerial husbandry. How a firm copes with the above constraint generates stochastic layoffs, lateral mobility, promotions, diverse earnings profiles, fast track jobs and up or out rules.
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Length: 26 Date of creation: Nov 1992 Date of revision: Publication status: Published, American Economic Review, 84(5), pages 1261-1277, December 1994 Handle: RePEc:cre:crefwp:5
Find related papers by JEL classification: M1 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration J - Labor and Demographic Economics
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