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International financial rescues and debtor country moral hazard

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  • Prasanna Gai
  • Ashley Taylor

Abstract

This paper examines whether recent international policy initiatives to facilitate financial rescues in emerging market countries have influenced debtors' incentives to access official sector resources. The paper highlights a country's systemic importance as a key characteristic that drives access to official sector finance. It estimates the effect of these financial rescue initiatives on IMF programme participation using a pooled probit model. The safety net permitting exceptional access is shown to have a greater marginal impact on official sector resource usage, the more systemically important the debtor country. The results can be interpreted as offering some support for the presence of debtor-country moral hazard. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004

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Paper provided by Money Macro and Finance Research Group in its series Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2003 with number 34.

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Date of creation: 27 Sep 2004
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Handle: RePEc:mmf:mmfc03:34

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  1. Barry Eichengreen & Andrew K. Rose & Charles Wyplosz, 1996. "Contagious Currency Crises," NBER Working Papers 5681, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Steven Phillips & Timothy D. Lane, 2000. "Does IMF Financing Result in Moral Hazard?," IMF Working Papers 00/168, International Monetary Fund.
  3. Robert J. Barro & Jong-Wha Lee, 2002. "IMF Programs: Who is Chosen and What Are the Effects?," NBER Working Papers 8951, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, 2002. "Testing Contract Theory : A Survey of Some Recent Work," Working Papers, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique 2002-11, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  5. Joyce, Joseph P., 1992. "The economic characteristics of IMF program countries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 237-242, February.
  6. Andrew G Haldane & Jorg Scheibe, 2004. "IMF lending and creditor moral hazard," Bank of England working papers 216, Bank of England.
  7. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1994. "Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the Incidence of Endogenous Policies," NBER Working Papers 4956, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Isabel Schnabel, 2002. "Moral Hazard and International Crisis Lending: A Test," IMF Working Papers 02/181, International Monetary Fund.
  9. Chiappori, P.A. & Durand, F. & Geoffard, P.Y., 1998. "Moral Hazard and the Demand for Physician Services: First Lessons from a French Natural Experiment," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) 98-05, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  10. Knight, Malcolm & Santaella, Julio A., 1997. "Economic determinants of IMF financial arrangements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 405-436, December.
  11. Reinhart, Carmen & Kaminsky, Graciela, 1998. "On crises, contagion, and confusion," MPRA Paper 13709, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Andy Haldane & Mark Kruger, 2001. "The Resolution of International Financial Crises: Private Finance and Public Funds," Working Papers, Bank of Canada 01-20, Bank of Canada.
  13. Blundell, Richard & Macurdy, Thomas, 1999. "Labor supply: A review of alternative approaches," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1559-1695 Elsevier.
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Cited by:
  1. Evrensel, Ayse Y. & Kim, Jong Sung, 2006. "Macroeconomic policies and participation in IMF programs," Economic Systems, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 264-281, October.
  2. Gregor Irwin & David Vines, 2004. "The efficient resolution of capital account crises: how to avoid moral hazard," Bank of England working papers 233, Bank of England.
  3. Axel Dreher, 2008. "IMF Conditionality: Theory and Evidence," KOF Working papers, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich 08-188, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  4. Axel Dreher, 2004. "Does the IMF cause moral hazard? A critical review of the evidence," International Finance, EconWPA 0402003, EconWPA, revised 29 Mar 2004.
  5. Lee, Jong-Wha & Shin, Kwanho, 2008. "IMF bailouts and moral hazard," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 816-830, September.
  6. Martin Brooke & Rhys R. Mendes & Alex Pienkowski & Eric Santor, 2013. "Sovereign Default and State-Contingent Debt," Discussion Papers 13-3, Bank of Canada.
  7. Andrew G Haldane & Jorg Scheibe, 2004. "IMF lending and creditor moral hazard," Bank of England working papers 216, Bank of England.
  8. Philipp Maier, 2007. "Do We Need the IMF to Resolve a Crisis? Lessons from Past Episodes of Debt Restructuring," Working Papers, Bank of Canada 07-10, Bank of Canada.

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