The Resolution of International Financial Crises: Private Finance and Public Funds
AbstractOver the past year and a half, the Bank of England and the Bank of Canada have been developing a framework for the resolution of international financial crises that aligns incentives for all parties to deal with a crisis and preserve the integrity of the international financial system. The framework is built on principles, not rules. It attempts to be clear about the respective roles and responsibilities of the public and private sectors. A central element in shaping private sector expectations is knowledge that the official sector will behave predictably. Constraints on lending by the International Monetary Fund are a key step in that direction. They ensure that private sector involvement is a crucial part of crisis resolution, and they help encourage debtors and creditors to seek co-operative solutions to a crisis. Characterized by constraints, clarity, and orderliness, the framework has the potential to reduce the incidence and cost of financial crises.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bank of Canada in its series Working Papers with number 01-20.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
- F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-12-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-IFN-2001-12-26 (International Finance)
- NEP-PKE-2001-12-26 (Post Keynesian Economics)
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