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Sovereign Liquidity Crisis: The Strategic Case for a Payments Standstill

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Author Info
Marcus Miller
Lei Zhang

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Abstract

Is sovereign borrowing so different from corporate debt that there is no need for bankruptcy- style procedures to protect debtors? With the waiver of immunity, sovereign debtors who already face severe disruption from short-term creditors grabbing their currency reserves are also exposed to litigious creditors trying to seize what assets they can in a 'race of the vultures'. Shielding sovereign debtors from inter-creditor conflict by authorised standstills on payments doubt-less runs some risk of debtor's moral hazard. But the lack of an orderly procedure for resolving sovereign liquidity crises means that the IMF is de facto forced to bail out countries in trouble. This leads to both debtor and creditor moral hazard, as investors lend without monitoring, knowing that their investments are essentially guaranteed. The strategic case for legalising standstills is to rescue the international financial system from this 'time consistent' trap.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick in its series CSGR Working papers series with number 35/99.

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Date of creation: Jun 1999
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Handle: RePEc:wck:wckewp:35/99

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Related research
Keywords: Sovereign borrowing; liquidity crises; moral hazard; time consistency; international institutions.;

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  1. Thomas, Jonathan P., 2002. "Bankruptcy Proceedings for Sovereign State Insolvency," Working Papers UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Joshua Aizenman, 2002. "Financial Opening: Evidence and Policy Options," NBER Working Papers 8900, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Andrew G Haldane & Gregor Irwin & Victoria Saporta, . "Bail out or work out? Theoretical considerations," Bank of England working papers 219, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jonathan Thomas, 2004. "Bankruptcy Proceedings for Sovereign State Insolvency and their Effect on Capital Flows," ESE Discussion Papers 93, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Peter B. Clark & Haizhou Huang, 2001. "International Financial Contagion and the Fund: A Theoretical Framework," IMF Working Papers 01/137, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ashoka Mody & Nienke Oomes & Michael D. Bordo, 2004. "Keeping Capital Flowing: The Role of the IMF," IMF Working Papers 04/197, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Alba, Pedro & Bhattacharya, Amar & Claessens, Stijn & Ghosh, Swati & Hernandez, Leonardo, 1998. "Volatility and contagion in a financially integrated world : lessons from East Asia's recent experience," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2008, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  8. José Wynne & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2004. "Renegotiation, Collective Action Clauses and Sovereign Debt Markets," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 153, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Olivier Jeanne & Jonathan David Ostry & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2008. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," IMF Working Papers 08/236, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Luisa Lambertini, 2001. "Volatility and Sovereign Default," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 577, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Benjamin Martin & Adrian Penalver, . "The effect of payments standstills on yields and the maturity structure of international debt," Bank of England working papers 184, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
  12. Galati, Davide & Sitzia, Bruno, 2000. "Sovereign bond ratings and market spreads. a dynamic panel analysis," MPRA Paper 8984, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  13. Robert Dekle & Kenneth Kletzer, 2002. "Financial intermediation, agency and collateral and the dynamics of banking crises: theory and evidence for the Japanese banking crisis," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Sep. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Joshua Aizenman, 2003. "Reforming the global financial system," Center for Global, International and Regional Studies, Working Paper Series 1019, Center for Global, International and Regional Studies, UC Santa Cruz. [Downloadable!]
  15. Yung Chul PARK & Yunjong WANG, 2001. "Reform Of The International Financial System And Institutions In Light Of The Asian Financial Crisis," G-24 Discussion Papers 12, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. [Downloadable!]
  16. Andy Haldane & Mark Kruger, 2001. "The Resolution of International Financial Crises: Private Finance and Public Funds," Working Papers 01-20, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
  17. Olivier Jeanne, 2004. "Debt Maturity and the International Financial Architecture," IMF Working Papers 04/137, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  18. Joshua Aizenman & Stephen J. Turnovsky, 2002. "Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard -- on Debtors or Creditors?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 107-132, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Aitor Erce-Domínguez, 2006. "Using standstills to manage sovereign debt crises," Banco de España Working Papers 0636, Banco de España. [Downloadable!]
  20. Adrian Penalver, . "How can the IMF catalyse private capital flows? A model," Bank of England working papers 215, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
  21. Arminio Fraga & Daniel L. Gleizer, 2001. "Constrained Discretion and Collective Action Problems: Reflections on the Resolution of International Financial Crises," Working Papers Series 34, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
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