Verso una procedura fallimentare per il debito sovrano e maggiore disciplina nei finanziamenti del Fondo Monetario Internazionale. Una valutazione di mezza via
AbstractThe paper reviews the area of the international financial architecture relating to sovereign crisis resolution. It is argued that shifting part of the burden of crisis resolution onto creditors may encourage debtor countries to take early action to counter an unsustainable debt path. Collective action clauses, the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, and ceilings on IMF loans, are all necessary components of a new and better crisis resolution framework.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Economia civile in its journal Moneta e Credito.
Volume (Year): 56 (2003)
Issue (Month): 222 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.economiacivile.it
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- O19 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Barry Eichengreen, 1991.
"Historical Research on International Lending and Debt,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 149-169, Spring.
- Eichengreen, Barry, 1990. "Historical Research on International Lending and Debt," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt39n6n9ns, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Barry Eichengreen., 1990. "Historical Research on International Lending and Debt," Economics Working Papers 90-153, University of California at Berkeley.
- Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2001.
"International bailouts, moral hazard and conditionality,"
CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 16(33), pages 407-432, October.
- Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2001. "International Bailouts, Moral Hazard, and Conditionality," CESifo Working Paper Series 563, CESifo Group Munich.
- Xavier Freixas & Curzio Giannini & Glenn Hoggarth & Farouk Soussa, 2000. "Lender of Last Resort: What Have We Learned Since Bagehot?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 63-84, October.
- Miller, Marcus & Zhang, Lei, 1998.
"Sovereign Liquidity Crises: the Strategic Case for a Payments Standstill,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1820, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Miller, Marcus & Zhang, Lei, 2000. "Sovereign Liquidity Crises: The Strategic Case for a Payments Standstill," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(460), pages 335-62, January.
- Marcus H. Miller & Lei Zhang, 1999. "Sovereign Liquidity Crisis: The Strategic Case for A Payments Standstill," Working Paper Series WP99-8, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
- Marcus Miller & Lei Zhang, 1999. "Sovereign Liquidity Crisis: The Strategic Case for a Payments Standstill," CSGR Working papers series 35/99, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick.
- Neil Wallace, 1988. "Another attempt to explain an illiquid banking system: the Diamond and Dybvig model with sequential service taken seriously," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall, pages 3-16.
- Andrei Shleifer, 2003.
"Will the Sovereign Debt Market Survive?,"
NBER Working Papers
9493, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Will The Sovereign Debt Market Survive?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2000, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Carlo A. Sdralevich & Biaggio Bossone, 2002. "The New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring," IMF Policy Discussion Papers 02/4, International Monetary Fund.
- Eichengreen, Barry & Portes, Richard, 1990. "The Interwar Debt Crisis and Its Aftermath," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 5(1), pages 69-94, January.
- Kenneth Rogoff, 1999.
"International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 21-42, Fall.
- Kenneth Rogoff, 1999. "International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability," NBER Working Papers 7265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Curzio Giannini & Carlo Cottarelli, 2002. "Bedfellows, Hostages, or Perfect Strangers? Global Capital Markets and the Catalytic Effect of IMF Crisis Lending," IMF Working Papers 02/193, International Monetary Fund.
- Dooley, Michael P., 2000. "International financial architecture and strategic default: can financial crises be less painful?," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 361-377, December.
- Ales Bulir & Marianne Schulze-Gattas & Atish R. Ghosh & Alex Mourmouras & A. Javier Hamann & Timothy D. Lane, 2002. "IMF-Supported Programs in Capital Account Crises," IMF Occasional Papers 210, International Monetary Fund.
- Andy Haldane & Mark Kruger, 2001. "The Resolution of International Financial Crises: Private Finance and Public Funds," Working Papers 01-20, Bank of Canada.
- Mario Sarcinelli, 2004. "The new financial architecture: from substantive to procedural rules," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 57(231), pages 337-363.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Carlo D'Ippoliti).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.