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Verso una procedura fallimentare per il debito sovrano e maggiore disciplina nei finanziamenti del Fondo Monetario Internazionale. Una valutazione di mezza via

Author

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  • Curzio Giannini

    (Banca d' Italia, Ufficio Relazioni Internazionali, Roma)

Abstract

The paper reviews the area of the international financial architecture relating to sovereign crisis resolution. It is argued that shifting part of the burden of crisis resolution onto creditors may encourage debtor countries to take early action to counter an unsustainable debt path. Collective action clauses, the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, and ceilings on IMF loans, are all necessary components of a new and better crisis resolution framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Curzio Giannini, 2003. "Verso una procedura fallimentare per il debito sovrano e maggiore disciplina nei finanziamenti del Fondo Monetario Internazionale. Una valutazione di mezza via," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 56(222), pages 161-193.
    • Handle: RePEc:psl:moneta:2003:22
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    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/monetaecredito/article/view/9808/9693
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Mario Sarcinelli, 2004. "The new financial architecture: from substantive to procedural rules," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 57(231), pages 337-363.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Debt; IMF; Lending;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations

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