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Superstar Central Bankers

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  • Matthias Neuenkirch

    ()
    (University of Trier)

  • Peter Tillmann

    ()
    (University of Giessen)

Abstract

The personalities of central bankers moved center stage during the recent financial crisis. Some central bankers even gained “superstar” status. In this paper, we evaluate the pivotal role of superstar central bankers by assessing the difference an outstanding governor makes to economic performance. We employ school grades given to central bankers by the financial press. A superstar central banker is one receiving the top grade. In a probit estimation we first relate the grades to measures of economic performance, institutional features, and personal characteristics. We then employ a nearest neighbor matching approach to identify the central bankers which are closest to those receiving the top grade and compare the economic performance across both groups. The results suggest that a superstar governor indeed matters: a topgraded central banker faces a significantly more favorable output-inflation trade-off than his peers.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) in its series MAGKS Papers on Economics with number 201354.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in
Handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:201354

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Keywords: Central banking; inflation expectations; monetary policy; nearest neighbor matching;

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  22. Matthias Neuenkirch, 2011. "Central Bank Transparency and Financial Market Expectations: The Case of Emerging Markets," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201136, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
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  24. Matthias Neuenkirch & Peter Tillmann, 2012. "Inflation Targeting, Credibility, and Non-Linear Taylor Rules," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201235, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  25. Matthias Neuenkirch & Florian Neumeier, 2013. "Party Affiliation Rather than Former Occupation: The Background of Central Bank Governors and its Effect on Monetary Policy," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201336, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
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