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Central Bank Transparency and Financial Stability: Measurement, Determinants and Effects

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Abstract

We develop a comprehensive index of the transparency of central banks regarding their policy framework to promote financial stability for 110 countries from 2000 to 2011 and examine the determinants and effects of this transparency. We find that the degree of transparency increased in the 2000s, though it still varied greatly across the countries in our study. Our regression results suggest that more developed countries exhibit greater transparency, that episodes of high financial stress have a negative effect on transparency and that the legal origin matters, too. Importantly, we find that transparency regarding the level of financial stability is strongly affected by monetary policy transparency. The central banks that have a transparent monetary policy are more likely to show increased transparency in their framework for financial stability. Our results also suggest a non-linear effect of central bank financial stability transparency on financial stress. Unless the financial sector experiences severe distress, greater transparency is beneficial for financial stability.

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  • Roman Horvath & Dan Vaško, 2012. "Central Bank Transparency and Financial Stability: Measurement, Determinants and Effects," Working Papers IES 2012/25, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Sep 2012.
    • Handle: RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2012_25
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    1. Mr. Martin Cihak, 2006. "How Do Central Banks Writeon Financial Stability?," IMF Working Papers 2006/163, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Alex Cukierman, 2009. "The Limits of Transparency," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 38(1‐2), pages 1-37, February.
    3. Crowe, Christopher & Meade, Ellen E., 2008. "Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 763-777, December.
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    5. Thomas Breuer & Martin Jandacka & Klaus Rheinberger & Martin Summer, 2009. "How to Find Plausible, Severe and Useful Stress Scenarios," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 5(3), pages 205-224, September.
    6. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    7. Benjamin Born & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2011. "Macroprudential policy and central bank communication," BIS Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Macroprudential regulation and policy, volume 60, pages 107-110, Bank for International Settlements.
    8. Ms. Sònia Muñoz & Mr. Samir Jahjah & Mr. Martin Cihak & Ms. Sharika Teh Sharifuddin & Mr. Kalin I Tintchev, 2012. "Financial Stability Reports: What Are they Good for?," IMF Working Papers 2012/001, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Mr. Stephan Danninger & Ms. Irina Tytell & Mr. Ravi Balakrishnan & Mr. Selim A Elekdag, 2009. "The Transmission of Financial Stress from Advanced to Emerging Economies," IMF Working Papers 2009/133, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Cardarelli, Roberto & Elekdag, Selim & Lall, Subir, 2011. "Financial stress and economic contractions," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 78-97, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Neuenkirch, Matthias & Tillmann, Peter, 2014. "Superstar Central Bankers," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100489, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Matthias Neuenkirch & Peter Tillmann, 2016. "Does A Good Central Banker Make A Difference?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(3), pages 1541-1560, July.
    3. Dimas M. Fazio & Benjamin M. Tabak & Daniel O. Cajueiro, 2014. "Inflation Targeting and Banking System Soundness: A Comprehensive Analysis," Working Papers Series 347, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    4. Michal Franta & Jozef Baruník & Roman Horváth & Katerina Smídková, 2014. "Are Bayesian Fan Charts Useful? The Effect of Zero Lower Bound and Evaluation of Financial Stability Stress Tests," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 10(1), pages 159-188, March.
    5. Fazio, Dimas M. & Tabak, Benjamin M. & Cajueiro, Daniel O., 2015. "Inflation targeting: Is IT to blame for banking system instability?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 76-97.
    6. Georgescu, Oana-Maria & Gross, Marco & Kapp, Daniel & Kok, Christoffer, 2017. "Do stress tests matter? Evidence from the 2014 and 2016 stress tests," Working Paper Series 2054, European Central Bank.
    7. El-Shagi, Makram & Jung, Alexander, 2015. "Have minutes helped markets to predict the MPC's monetary policy decisions?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 222-234.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    financial stability; transparency; central banks;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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