Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Repeated Signaling Games

Contents:

Author Info

  • Ayça Kaya

    (University of Iowa)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Although many signaling situations are best interpreted as repeated games, prior research often models them as one-shot games. We analyze a class of repeated signaling games in which the informed player's type is persistent and the history of actions are perfectly observable. In this context a large class of possibly complex sequences of signals can be supported as the separating equilibrium actions of the \strong type" of the informed player. We characterize the set of such sequences. We also characterize the sequences of signals in least cost separating equilibria of these games. We show that these sequences in general have a simple structure. Moreover, many of them involve costly signaling after beliefs become degenerate.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/cie/dp/dp_2003-2006/2005-07.pdf/
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics in its series CIE Discussion Papers with number 2005-07.

    as in new window
    Length: 45 pages
    Date of creation: May 2005
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:kud:kuieci:2005-07

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark
    Phone: (0045) 35 32 30 54
    Fax: +45 35 32 30 00
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.econ.ku.dk/cie/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: signaling games; dynamic games; repeated games; asymmetric information;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Swinkels, Jeroen M, 1999. "Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(4), pages 949-70, October.
    2. Noldecke,Georg & van Damme,Eric, 1988. "Signalling in a dynamic labor market," Discussion Paper Serie A 148, University of Bonn, Germany.
    3. Kremer, Ilan & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2007. "Dynamic signaling and market breakdown," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 58-82, March.
    4. van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 476-496, August.
    5. Esther Gal-Or, 1989. "Warranties as a Signal of Quality," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(1), pages 50-61, February.
    6. Linnemer, Laurent, 2002. "Price and advertising as signals of quality when some consumers are informed," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 931-947, September.
    7. Georg Nöldeke & Eric van Damme, 1990. "Switching Away From Probability One Beliefs," Discussion Paper Serie A 304, University of Bonn, Germany.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kud:kuieci:2005-07. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Hoffmann).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.