Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium

Contents:

Author Info

  • Cho, In-Koo
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    The author proposes a refinement of seq uential equilibrium for extensive form games by generalizing a restri ction proposed for signaling games in Cho and D. M. Kreps (1987). The restriction is that beliefs must not assign positive weight to the p ossibilities that can be excluded through reasonable introspection ba sed on the data available as common knowledge. A new technique is dev eloped in order to prove the existence of forward induction equilibri um, which consists of two steps. First, the author establishes the ge neric existence of forward induction equilibrium by exploiting the re sults of E. Kohlberg and J. F. Mertens (1986). Then, he shows that th e forward induction equilibrium correspondence is upper hemicontinuou s in the outcome space with respect to the changes of parameters of t he game. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198711%2955%3A6%3C1367%3AAROSE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8&origin=repec
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

    Volume (Year): 55 (1987)
    Issue (Month): 6 (November)
    Pages: 1367-89

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:55:y:1987:i:6:p:1367-89

    Contact details of provider:
    Phone: 1 212 998 3820
    Fax: 1 212 995 4487
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/
    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information:
    Email:
    Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/memb.asp?ref=0012-9682

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius J., 2002. "The game of negotiations: ordering issues and implementing agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 169-191, November.
    2. Facundo Albornoz & Joan Esteban & Paolo Vanin, 2009. "Government Information Transparency," Working Papers 392, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    3. Tercieux, Olivier & Aghion, Philippe & Fudenberg, Drew & Holden, Richard & Kunimoto, Takashi, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," Scholarly Articles 11224965, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    4. Persons, John C., 2000. "Fully revealing equilibria with suboptimal investment," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 331-344, September.
    5. Cramton, Peter C, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 205-25, January.
    6. Lemke, Robert J., 2004. "Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(9), pages 1847-1875, July.
    7. John C. Persons, . "Fully Revealing Equilibria with Suboptimal Investment," Research in Financial Economics 9507, Ohio State University.
    8. Kyle Bagwell & Michael Riordan, 1988. "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality," Discussion Papers 808, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    9. Kaya, Ayça, 2009. "Repeated signaling games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 841-854, July.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:55:y:1987:i:6:p:1367-89. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.