Education Signaling with Preemptive Offers
AbstractWe analyse a version of Spence's job market signalling model in which firms can make job offers before workers complete their education. Workers cannot commit to turning down such offers. Offers are private, so that workers are unable to use one firm's offer in an attempt to elicit better offers from other firms. In the unique sequential equilibrium outcome of the model with unproductive education, there is no wasteful education. When education is productive, the standard model predicts that more able individuals become overeducated to separate themselves from less able workers. In our model, less able workers become overeducated to (partially) pool with more able workers. The pooling mutes the incentives of high ability workers, who in consequence actually choose to become undereducated. We examine the robustness of our result to modifications to the basic model. Copyright 1999 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1175.
Date of creation: Jan 1997
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