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A Model of Dynamic Conflict in Ethnocracies

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  • Bakshi, Dripto

    (Indian Statistical Institute)

  • Dasgupta, Indraneel

    (Indian Statistical Institute)

Abstract

We model an infinitely repeated Tullock contest, over the sharing of some given resource, between two ethnic groups. The resource is allocated by a composite state institution according to relative ethnic control; hence the ethnic groups contest the extent of institutional ethnic bias. The contest yields the per-period relative influence over institutions, which partly spills over into the next period, by affecting relative conflict efficiency. Our model generates non-monotone evolution of both conflict and distribution. Results suggest that external interventions, when effective in reducing current conflict and protecting weaker groups, may end up sowing the seeds of greater future conflict.

Suggested Citation

  • Bakshi, Dripto & Dasgupta, Indraneel, 2015. "A Model of Dynamic Conflict in Ethnocracies," IZA Discussion Papers 9159, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9159
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    Cited by:

    1. Dripto Bakshi & Indraneel Dasgupta, 2021. "A Subscription vs. Appropriation Framework for Natural Resource Conflicts," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Anil Markandya & Dirk Rübbelke (ed.), CLIMATE AND DEVELOPMENT, chapter 9, pages 257-307, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Dasgupta, Indraneel & Pal, Sarmistha, 2021. "Touch thee not: Group conflict, caste power and untouchability in rural India," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 442-466.
    3. Dripto Bakshi & Indraneel Dasgupta, 2020. "Identity Conflict with Cross-Border Spillovers," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(7), pages 786-809, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    ethnocracy; ethnic conflict; dynamic contest; rent-seeking; inter-temporal productivity carryover;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • O20 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - General

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