Risk Taking Behavior in Tournaments: Evidence from the NBA
AbstractWe empirically explore the relevance of risk taking behavior in tournaments. We make use of data from the NBA season 2007/2008 and measure risk taking by the fraction of three-point shots. Current heterogeneity of teams is taken into account by intermediate results. It turns out that indeed teams who are behind increase the risk in terms of more three-point attempts. We additionally analyze the consequences of this change in behavior. Enhanced risk taking is inefficient for the vast majority of cases and only beneficial in terms of a higher winning probability if a team is behind with a rather large amount of points. We discuss possible explanations for these decision errors.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 4812.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2010
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-03-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2010-03-28 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-SPO-2010-03-28 (Sports & Economics)
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Should losing NBA teams take 3 point shots?
by Ariel Goldring in Free Market Mojo on 2010-08-30 14:07:21
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